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ABSTRACT 
 The paper addresses the core transfer pricing issue of allowing source and 
receiving divisions or companies to maintain autonomy and profit from transfers in such 
a way that sub-optimal output levels are avoided. It develops a pragmatic-analytical 
model by introducing multiple transfer prices and shows that the proportion of 
contribution over which negotiation is required can be made negligible. Combining 
multiple transfer prices and interdivisional negotiation can assure economically optimal 
solutions while maintaining divisional autonomy and avoiding excessive negotiations. 
In intragroup relationships and situations in which unrelated companies have an 
overriding concern for the maintenance of trust, this model provides a mechanism for a 
‘fair’ division of contribution without the need for potentially costly and trust-
destroying negotiation. The model is particularly suitable for large corporations which, 
previously centralized, now seek a middle ground of significant decentralization but 
without the consequences of unconstrained market forces.  This applies internationally 
to a number of privatised industries and is especially relevant in transitional economies.   
 
Keywords: Profit maximisation; Supply chain management; Management research; 
Pricing; Decision making. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Transfer pricing, one of the fundamental problems in accounting and 
economics, was first considered by Hirshleifer (1956) and has been widely studied over 
a long period of time. Stated simply, the problem arises out of dividing a single 
enterprise into two or more units.  In such a scenario a transfer price greater than the 
marginal cost to the ‘upstream’ unit can distort the profit maximizing pricing and 
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volume decisions of the ‘downstream’ unit, thereby reducing the profitability of the 
enterprise as a whole.  However, centralizing the decisions about quantities traded and 
the price at which transfers of goods or services are made will potentially remove the 
behavioural benefits, related to divisional autonomy, which are the motivation for 
divisionalization in the first place.   
 
 Although many works have been devoted to resolve the problem, no completely 
satisfactory solution is known in the absence of a perfect market for the intermediate 
goods. Vancil (1979) concluded that “the issue remains a perennial puzzle for 
academicians, while practitioners continue to cope” (p. 142).  Tomkins (1990) brought 
these two perspectives together in his pragmatic-analytical model which incorporated 
both a ‘cost-plus’ approach and the process of negotiation.  Our objective in this paper 
is to extend that model by addressing the problem of excessive, and consequently 
destructive, negotiation over quantities and prices at the margin. The introduction of 
more than one transfer price into the negotiation-based model broadens its applicability 
by limiting the proportion of inter-unit trade which is subject to the potentially 
destructive process of negotiation. 
 
  In Section 2, below, we explain the basic transfer pricing problem and relevant 
prescriptions in the literature.  Section 3 considers the advantages of negotiation and 
potential problems arising out of unconstrained negotiation.  Section 4 outlines the 
contexts which give our model contemporary relevance.  Thereafter Section 5 provides 
a detailed exposition of Tomkins (1990) and its principal limitations.  This is followed, 
in Section 6, by an explanation of our multiple transfer price model, and provides a 
schedule to be used in applying it.   Finally, the paper ends with a brief summary and 
acknowledgement of limitations.  
 
 
2. THE TRANSFER PRICING CONUNDRUM AND PRESCRIPTIONS PROPOSED IN THE 
LITERATURE 
 
 A number of approaches to resolving the transfer pricing conflicts are 
documented1. For example, goods can be transferred between the divisions at variable 
cost with contribution (and profit) for the source division being provided by an 
additional periodic charge; however, this two-part transfer price system has a serious 
disadvantage because “the source division has no incentive to seek the optimal 
production level as it earns no profit on transactions made during the period” (Tomkins, 
1990, p. 202). Another approach is based on sharing the group profit earned on the 
transferred goods, but its shortcomings include problems with the book-keeping and the 
interpretation of the divisional profit figures. Also, a more advanced dual-rate transfer 
pricing system has been proposed in which the prices used for accounting purposes are 
different from those used for managerial evaluation of the profitability of divisions. 
However, this system has diminished credibility and potentially leads to confusion. 
                                                 
1 The purpose of this paper is not to provide a comprehensive review of the transfer pricing literature; 
authoritative evaluations of this field may be found in Abdel-Khalik and Lusk (1974), Emmanuel and 
Mehafdi (1994), Grabski (1985), McAulay and Tomkins (1992), McAulay et al. (2001), Thomas (1980), 
Ewert and Wagenhofer (2006), and Göx and Schiller  (2007). authoritative evaluations of this field may 
be found in Abdel-Khalik and Lusk (1974), Emmanuel and Mehafdi (1994), Grabski (1985), McAulay 
and Tomkins (1992), McAulay et al. (2001), Thomas (1980), Ewert and Wagenhofer (2006), and Göx 
and Schiller  (2007). 
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 Borkowski (1988), Kaplan and Atkinson (1989) and Wu and Sharp (1979) 
pointed out that the transfer price based on full-cost plus profit predominates but that it 
should not be used because such a system lacks economic validity and leads to 
incorrect decisions. Surveys of transfer pricing practice (Abu-Serdaneh, 2004; 
Borkowski, 1990) showed that the ‘cost-plus’ methods are indeed widely used, and 
therefore consideration should be given to developing explanatory theories for that 
approach.  McAulay et al. (2001, p. 88) note that “Tomkins (1990) addresses the issue 
of the use of absorption costing by practitioners through a model which explains how 
this technique can lead to an approximate maximization of short-term profits. … The 
old cry, which privileged marginal costing over absorption costing, is almost silenced, 
but concern for optimization, and the respective merits of alternative technical 
approaches, retains its potency.” 
 
 Few, if any, models satisfactorily resolve the core problems of allowing both the 
source and receiving divisions to be autonomous and earn a profit on transfers during a 
period in such a way that sub-optimal output levels are avoided. Back in 1969, Samuels 
proposed a transfer price schedule instead of just a single transfer price; however this 
model has a number of disadvantages discussed in the next section. A practical 
outcome of the transfer pricing ‘puzzle’ is that many multidivisional enterprises have 
‘sacrificed’ economic optimality and adopted the approach of allowing divisions to 
negotiate ‘at arm’s length’ as if they were completely independent entities. In 
recognition of this Tomkins (1990) built on Samuels’ model and outlined a pragmatic-
analytical transfer pricing approach which combines a single cost-plus transfer price 
and the process of negotiation2. The important feature is that approximate short-run 
optimality may be retained and the transfer prices are acceptable for management 
purposes. Tomkins’ intention was to justify the pragmatic approach that many 
companies seem to adopt whereby a cost-plus transfer price is adopted for some of the 
volume transferred.  In addition, his approach effectively mitigates the deviation 
(caused by the price being above marginal cost) from economic optimality, by allowing 
negotiation between divisions about extra quantities at negotiated prices lower than the 
initial cost-plus price.  
 
 
3. NEGOTIATION AND ITS POTENTIAL PROBLEMS  
 
 The transfer pricing behaviour of Tomkins’ partial negotiation model is good 
when the target contribution for the source division is ‘small enough’. However, the 
practical value of his approach is limited if the source division’s target contribution is 
‘close’ to half of the maximum group contribution, because in this case the scale of the 
negotiation needed is excessive, time-consuming and expensive.  Furthermore, the 
managers of the source and receiving divisions usually have unequal power and the 
possibility of exploiting such power difference is substantial.  
 
 Also, in practice there are operational situations where divisions do not wish to 
get involved in negotiations, or there is a real concern about fairness. The issue of 
fairness is indeed important. According to Paz-Vega (2007, p.232) perceived fairness 
affects organizational variables such as “commitment, intention to turnover, 
                                                 
2 A more detailed comparison of Samuels’ policy and Tomkins’ model is given in Section 5. 
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organizational citizenship behaviours, trust in management, productivity, and job 
satisfaction”. Applying the work of Husted and Folger (2004), he argues that “unfair 
transfer-pricing policies and practices generate important agency and transaction costs 
that jeopardize the expected outcomes of international strategies of vertical 
integration.” (Paz-Vega, 2007, p.221) 
 
 In certain circumstances, a high level of negotiation may be contrary to the 
organizational culture and, as Paz-Vega (2007) points out, many companies still adopt 
the criterion of centralized profit maximization imposed by mandatory policies.  This 
may be particularly appropriate in companies situated in the transitional economies, 
where head offices may still want to exercise greater control over their divisions. In 
collectivistic cultures, equality for within–group distributions is often an objective.  In 
order to maintain fair social relationships “collectivistic cultures prefer procedural rules 
are based on mediation, compromise, and negotiation.” (Paz-Vega, 2007, p.231) 
 
 Additionally, a high level of negotiation and potential variability of transfer 
prices may be contrary to strategic imperatives; for instance when the group for some 
particular reasons would like to keep both divisions going profitably for the long term. 
The model of Edlin and Reichelstein (1995) explains the common use of negotiated 
transfer pricing. However, they highlight that the cost of bargaining (‘haggling’) may 
be an issue and in some cases (with incomplete information) a system of negotiated 
transfer pricing will not be efficient and an administered pricing policy may overcome 
this problem.  They also argue that, in cases where it is difficult for parties to sign a 
prior contract, negotiated transfer pricing may lead to an underinvestment problem3.   
 
 So, it can be seen that, in various contexts, protracted negotiation has serious 
limitations. Indeed, it can lead to a conflict between the divisions and also to sub-
optimal economic, strategic and behavioural decisions.  But the accounting literature 
(e.g. Tomkins (2001), Johansson and Baldvinsdottir (2003), Chenhall (2008)) shows 
that in the current climate of alliances and networks there is significantly more interest 
in organizational collaboration (both within large corporate groups and between 
companies) and a recognition of the potential benefits of trust between parties.  To this 
end, and to promote communication and collaboration, there is great emphasis on 
negotiation.   Kraus and Lind (2007, p.281) urge companies to invest in trust building 
activities and explain that this can be done “by holding regular meetings, establishing 
performance measures that can be used to divide the benefits of the relationship.”  So, 
while there may be benefit in limiting negotiation and thereby promoting fairness, it is 
essential that the divisions retain an opportunity to negotiate some level of output 
transferred. Voice, which is the possibility of expressing opinions and feelings during 
the process of decision making, and participation are recognized as the key 
determinants of procedural justice perception in many different cultures (Greenberg, 
2001; Morris and Leung, 2000 cited by Paz-Vega, 2009).  Therefore, an appropriate 
compromise is to allow some participation in the transfer-pricing process in order to 
“achieve enhanced perceptions of procedural fairness”. (Paz-Vega, 2009, p.228) 
 
 
                                                 
3 They recognize that a cost-based transfer pricing rule may ameliorate the underinvestment problem but 
“if the cost-based rule is administered by H.Q., and not subject to renegotiation, it may lead to quantity 
transfers that are ex-post inefficient”. (Edlin and Reichelstein, 1995, p.288) 
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4.  A PRACTICAL WAY FORWARD: IMPOSED TRANSFER PRICES SUPPLEMENTED 
BY NEGOTIATION 
 
 In this paper, we extend Tomkins’ pragmatic-analytical model by introducing 
multiple transfer prices. As we shall show, by using just a few transfer prices, it is 
possible to guarantee that the proportion of group contribution over which negotiation 
is required is kept very low and consequently the arrangement reduces the risk of 
managers taking advantage of unequal power. Our ‘most typical’ transfer price 
schedule consists of just two transfer prices. This analytical improvement overcomes 
the disadvantages of the process of negotiation, while still keeping its attractive 
features. Thus, our method motivates divisional managers to make optimal economic 
decisions without undermining divisional autonomy, and provides a reasonable 
measure for evaluating the managerial and economic performance of the source and 
receiving divisions, while also being acceptable for taxation purposes4. 
 
 It should be noted that our model is particularly suitable for large corporations 
which, previously centralized, now seek a middle ground of significant decentralization 
but without the consequences of unconstrained market forces.  This applies 
internationally to a number of privatised industries and is especially relevant in 
transitional economies.  According to the empirical study of 40 multinational 
headquarters for Central and Eastern Europe carried out by Brenner (2008), the great 
majority of multinationals in that region govern their subsidiaries centrally.   
 
 The model also has relevance to situations in which the relationship, for 
specified supply chains, between free-standing independent companies is equivalent to 
that between fellow subsidiaries or divisions.  “Increasingly, business alliances … 
involve collaboration over development and investment and not just trading on the 
basis of existing goods.  Negotiation then needs to be supported by revised requests for 
information and revised calculations of costs and benefits to each party.  … each party 
will not participate in the project unless it sees the prospect of fair rewards” (Tomkins, 
2001, p. 163).  Kraus and Lind (2007) recommend that with moderate levels of 
specificity of ‘intermediate product’ and of uncertainty “an inter-organisational 
relationship can be anticipated, as alternative controls are needed to protect the 
transaction from an opportunistic breach of contract.” (p.283)  In appropriate 
circumstances they urge a “bureaucracy based pattern linked to specified norms, 
standards and rules, and the measurement and evaluation of performance.” (p.284)  In 
such circumstances, with mutual dependencies, there may be an imperative, as the basis 
for ongoing collaboration, that the sharing of contribution is ‘fair’ (within some agreed 
boundaries) and that the relationship is ‘in good faith’ not marred by negotiation or 
‘bullying’ by the more powerful party5.  They refer to networks found by Mouritsen 
and Thrane (2005) in which transfer prices “distributed the financial gains arising from 
each relationship according to rules laid down at the outset.”  (Kraus and Lind, 2007, 
p.288).  This is the arrangement that we envisage in our model which we explain in the 
following two sections. 
                                                 
4 National tax authorities may not accept marginal cost transfer prices. 
5 The issue of relational versus transactional relationships and their implications for performance 
measurement systems is explored in Broadbent and Laughlin (2009).  In the former “the ends and means 
are deliberately subject to a discourse between stakeholders … the specific focus will be less like a 
defined project, less short-term in nature and more concerned with the long term survival and 
sustainability” p. 289. 
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5. THE BASIS AND LIMITATION OF THE TOMKINS’ MODEL 
 
 We assume that Division A produces goods and transfers them to Division B, 
i.e. there is no intermediate market6, and Division B, after further processing, sells the 
goods to an external market. The divisionalized structure implies that head office seeks 
the benefits of decentralization such as increased motivation, local knowledge, faster 
decisions etc.  However, it will generally wish to do this while maintaining 
accountability and control via monitoring divisional profit performance.  Furthermore, 
it will aim to minimize deviation from the group’s economically optimal quantity and 
product pricing decisions.   
 
 Suppose that one wants both Division A and Division B to earn a profit on 
transfers in order to motivate them to optimally produce and transfer goods. To achieve 
this Samuels (1969) proposed the use of a schedule of transfer prices.  He suggested 
that there should be numerous transfer prices to encourage the supplying division (A) to 
produce and transfer a quantity near to the optimal level (q) at which A’s variable cost 
(VCA) equates to B’s net marginal revenue (NMRB).  As an incentive he proposed 
awarding a bonus to A on top of a given basic transfer price per unit.  The bonus would 
increase with each unit transferred by Division A up to the optimal level and then fall 
with each unit produced beyond that level. 
 
 Tomkins (1990) points out a number of disadvantages of Samuels’ model. The 
most serious trouble is that “one needs to know the optimal level of production and the 
amount to be transferred before one can see what point the pricing schedule needs to 
pass through” (Tomkins, 1990, p. 203). This model has not been widely adopted in 
industry – perhaps it is too complex to use, and therefore a simpler approach is often 
adopted. An improvement was given by Tomkins (1990) which combines a single 
transfer price and the pragmatic process of negotiation, as illustrated in Figure 1. The 
basic idea is that a company fixes a transfer price t by a cost-plus method for an output 
level f such that the following (first) condition is satisfied: “The transfer price line 
projected horizontally to the right must not cut through B’s net marginal revenue 
schedule if sub-optimal output levels are to be avoided.” (Tomkins, 1990, p. 207) 
 
 The transfer price t must be fixed in such a way that A’s fixed costs are covered 
and, moreover, a ‘reasonable’ profit is provided to A; see Figure 1. The area of 
negotiation (between f and q) is where the transfer price t is no longer applicable, i.e. A 
and B should negotiate further transfers. The scale of negotiation must satisfy the 
following (second) condition:  “The cost-plus transfer price must be applicable to a 
sizeable proportion of the optimal amount of output to be transferred in order to limit 
the scale of negotiation needed.” (Tomkins, 1990, p. 207) 
 
 
Figure 1. Tomkins’ pragmatic-analytical cost plus transfer pricing approach.  
 
 
 Thus, the objective is to maximize the proportion of optimal output, denoted by 
x [x = (f/q)], for which the cost-plus transfer price can be applied, subject to the first 
                                                 
6 The assumption that there is no external market is made only for analytical convenience. It is easy to 
prove that the model applies equally, with limited modification, where an imperfect intermediate goods 
market exists. 
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condition and the requirement that A’s fixed costs are covered and A’s profit is 
provided. Let c stand for source division’s target contribution as a proportion of 
maximum group contribution.  
 
 Under certain assumptions (see Section  6 below) Tomkins (1990) proved that, 
for a given c, the value of x can be found by solving the following quadratic equation:  
 
.0)1(2 =−− cxx  
 
 In fact, x is the upper root of the above equation, i.e. cx 5.025.05.0 −+= .  
The relationship between c, x and n is shown in Table 1 below, where n is a proportion 
of group contribution over which negotiation is still required.7  
 
 
Table 1.   An illustration of the required negotiation, under the single transfer 
price model, given different divisions of total contribution. 
 
 
 For example, if A’s target contribution is 18% of the total maximum group 
contribution, then the corresponding cost-plus transfer price can be applied to 90% of 
the optimal output to recover A’s target contribution. As can be seen in Table 1, the 
proportion of group contribution over which negotiation is required is only 1%, so the 
negotiation practically makes no difference. However, if A’s target contribution is close 
to 50% of the total maximum group contribution, then the proportion of group 
contribution over which negotiation is required becomes substantial. For instance, if c 
is equal to 50%, then negotiation is required over 25% of the group contribution, and 
the cost-plus transfer price can be applied to only 50% of the optimal output. Tomkins  
comments on this extreme case as follows: 
 
“First, it would still leave A and B to negotiate a price applicable to 50 per cent of 
the optimal output level and agree by negotiation a split of 25 per cent of the group 
contribution on that product. The costs of negotiation are likely to be too high if 
negotiation is required over half the volume produced and the possibility of taking 
advantage of unequal power will be quite substantial if 25 per cent of the 
contribution is involved. This limits the practical value of this transfer pricing 
approach.”  (Tomkins, 1990, p. 208) 
 
 The implications of Tomkins’ model for deriving a value for t, the transfer price 
that will lead to the desired value of c (target contribution) are obtainable from the 
formula: 
 
),1(2 xpt −=  
 
where p is the net average revenue corresponding to the output q.  
 
                                                 
7 The value of n can be found by the formula (Tomkins, 1990, p. 211):   
.
2
)1(
x
xcn −=  
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 In summary, it can be seen that transfer pricing behaviour of Tomkins’ model is 
excellent when c is ‘small’ enough, but its practical value is limited if c is ‘close’ to 
50%, and also since the model does not accommodate values of c over 50%.  
 
 We will see in the next section that, by introducing just a few transfer prices, it 
is possible to guarantee that the proportion of group contribution over which 
negotiation is required does not exceed 1%. This modification of Tomkins’ approach 
overcomes the above disadvantage but retains the simplicity and the attractive features 
of his model.  
 
 For convenience, let us summarize the notation introduced in this section:  
 
 
 
6. THE MULTIPLE TRANSFER PRICE MODEL 
 
 In this section, we show how Tomkins’ pragmatic-analytical model can be 
enhanced by introducing multiple transfer prices. For simplicity and consistency with 
this model, we assume the following: 
- Division A transfers goods to Division B, i.e. there is no intermediate good 
market. 
- All A’s and B’s costs are fixed. (The assumption that all the costs are fixed is 
made for analytical convenience. Later in the paper we will show how to adjust 
the formula to take into account variable costs.) 
- The net average revenue curve for the final product is linear. 
 
 Our model is applicable to situations where the level of c is agreed in advance 
by divisional managers or head office.  It also applies in relational alliances (see, for 
instance, Dyer and Singh, 1998) between two independent companies.  In contexts of 
trust, information on the cost and revenue functions of A and B are known by both 
parties.  Furthermore, owing the ‘relational’ nature of their alliance both divisions 
(companies) recognize the long term strategic benefits that can be derived from having 
q 
VCA 
NMRB 
p 
pq 
c 
t 
f 
x 
 
n 
The optimal level of output to be produced by Division A and transferred to B. 
Division A’s variable cost. 
Division B’s net marginal revenue. 
B’s net average revenue corresponding to the output q. 
The maximum contribution, which the entire group can earn. 
The target contribution for A as a proportion of maximum group contribution. 
The transfer price. 
B’s chosen output level corresponding to the transfer price t. 
Maximum proportion of optimal output for which the cost-plus transfer price 
can be applied. 
Proportion of group contribution over which negotiation required. 
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an agreed sharing of aggregate contribution.  A consequence of this is that potentially 
costly negotiation over prices and quantities envisaged by the Tomkins model is 
replaced by limited negotiation over the magnitude of c. 
 
 Let q be the optimal level of output to be produced by A and transferred to B, 
and let p denote the net average revenue corresponding to the output q, i.e. q units will 
be sold at a net average revenue of p. Thus, the maximum contribution, which the entire 
group can earn, can be represented as the area pq, and the maximum group profit is pq 
minus A’s and B’s fixed costs.  
 
 The Division A’s target contribution can be represented as a proportion c of the 
maximum group contribution pq. The transfer price schedule for a specified proportion      
c will consist of transfer prices ti, and the corresponding points fi of the optimal output 
q, where 1≤i≤k; k being the number of transfer prices to be applied. This schedule 
means that the first transfer price t1 should be applied to the output between 0 and f1, 
and the i-th transfer price ti should be applied to the output between fi-1 and fi. The 
schedule with three transfer prices is illustrated in Figure 2. A’s target contribution c is 
obviously equal to the area of the three rectangles R1, R2 and R3 divided by pq. Note 
that the first rectangle R1 will be ‘optimally’ constructed according to the technique 
used by Tomkins (1990), and all the rectangles are congruent by construction, because 
the aim is to maximize the proportion of optimal output for which the transfer prices are 
applied.  
 
 
Figure 2.  An illustration of how a three transfer price arrangement would work 
 
 
 For 1≤i≤k, let us denote 
yi = ti /p, 
 
i.e. yi is a proportion of p corresponding to the i-th transfer price ti. Let xi be a 
proportion of the optimal output to which that transfer price should be applied, i.e.  
 
x1 = f1/q, 
and for 2≤i≤k, 
xi = (fi - fi-1)/q. 
 
 As explained above, all the rectangles Ri  are congruent and so x1 can be actually 
used as a ratio in a formula for determining xi. More precisely, for 2≤i≤k, xi is equal to 
the ‘remaining proportion’ of q multiplied by x1: 
 
).1(11 11111111
2
1
1
1
1
xxxxxxxxxxxx iiii
i
j
j
i
j
ji −=−=−





−=





−= −−−−
−
=
−
=
∑∑  
 
Thus, 
.)1(......)1()1( 111
2
1211
−
−− −==−=−=
i
iii xxxxxxx  
  
 10 
 Let us find a formula for yi. It is well-known in microeconomics that the slope 
of NMRB is twice that of NARB, i.e. NMRB bisects any horizontal line between the 
vertical axis and NARB. 8  It follows that NARB and NMRB meets the vertical axis at 
point 2p. Using the equation of the line NMRB, we obtain  
 
,22 11 fq
ppt −=  
and hence 
).1(222/ 1111 xqxq
pty −=−==  
 
Therefore, using y1 as a ratio in the recursive definition of yi, we have 
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Thus c, the target contribution for A, is as follows: 
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 With c specified in advance, x1 can then be found from the above formula. In 
fact, for 0≤c≤0.66, x1 is one of the roots of the polynomial: 
 
.0)1(2
1
12
11 =−−∑
=
− cxx
k
i
i  
More precisely, x1 is the ‘upper’ root out of two roots between 0 and 1, because we 
want to maximize the proportion of optimal output for which the transfer prices are 
applied. If k = 1, then this polynomial is exactly the Tomkins quadratic equation: 
 
,0)1(2 11 =−− cxx  
 
and x1 is the ‘upper’ root c5.025.05.0 −+ , which maximizes the proportion of 
optimal output for which the transfer price is applied. However, if k is greater than 1, it 
is more difficult to find such a root.  For convenience, the values of x1 for different 
values of Division A’s target contribution c are given in Table 2.  This table shows the 
minimum number of transfer prices (k) that are required, for every value of c up to 
66%, within the constraint of keeping n (the proportion of contribution requiring 
negotiation) less than 1%9. It has been compiled by iteratively increasing the value of c 
                                                 
8 Let the net average revenue line be given by NARB(f) = a – bf, where a>0 is the intercept and b>0 is the 
slope of NARB.  The total revenue, denoted by TR, is TR(f) =  af – bf 2.  Therefore, the NMRB schedule is  
NMRB(f) bfa
f
2TR −=
∂
∂
= , i.e. the slope of NMRB is twice that of NARB.  Substituting q for f into the 
NARB and NMRB schedules, we obtain p = a – bq and 0 = a – 2bf, respectively. It follows that a = 2p. 
 
9 The choice of 1% is arbitrary – a similar table could be created showing the numbers of transfers prices 
required for given levels of c if a higher proportion of negotiation (e.g. 2%) was acceptable. 
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with a given number of transfer prices (k) until the value of n (negotiation proportion) 
exceeds 1% which then requires one extra transfer price. 
 
 
Table 2. The values of the basic parameters of the modified model. 
 
 
 The proportion of the optimal output for which the transfer prices are applied is 
denoted by x and is calculated as follows: 
.)1(
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 Recalling that n is the proportion of group contribution over which negotiation 
is possible, it is easy to see that 
 
.)1)(1()1(
2
1
1
k
k xxyxn −−=−=  
 
 The number of transfer prices k is defined as the minimum integer which will 
insure that n does not exceed 1%. It is not difficult to prove that, provided c does not 
exceed 66%, k ≤ 4. It appears that negotiation over n is optional because this proportion 
of group contribution never exceeds 1%, and the transfer price for this negligible part of 
output can effectively be set to zero.  
 
 In this section we have shown how the Tomkins model is enhanced, in terms of 
substantially reducing the required level of negotiation over quantities and prices. In 
addition, it can be seen that the enhanced model is more generally applicable since it 
can accommodate values of c (the source division’s target share of group contribution) 
greater than 50%; up to 66% as shown in Table 2. 
 
6.1. Transfer Price Schedule 
 
 Now, it is straightforward to produce the transfer price schedule consisting of 
transfer prices ti and the corresponding thresholds fi of the optimal output q, where 
1≤i≤k. Indeed, since ii pyt = , we obtain 
.)1(2 1
i
i xpt −=  
Note that the first transfer price t1 coincides with the transfer price proposed by 
Tomkins (1990), see Section5. Using the equation of the line NMRB, we have  
 
.22 ii fq
ppt −=  
Therefore, for 1≤i≤k, the thresholds are: 
 
).)1(1( 1
i
i xqf −−=                                                  (1) 
 
 Thus, the first transfer price t1 should be applied to the first f1 units of the 
output, the second transfer price t2 should be applied to the next f2 - f1 units and so on. 
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In other words, when the output reaches the threshold fi, the next transfer price ti+1 
should be applied. Of course, when fk is reached, we should apply either the price 
agreed by negotiation, or zero transfer price tk+1, which is more preferable.  
 
 Notice that if A’s variable cost is a non-zero constant, then it is not difficult to 
see that the following formula should be used to calculate the transfer prices: 
 
ti = 2(p – VCA)(1 – x1)i + VCA,                                       (2) 
 
where 1≤i≤k, and tk+1 is equal to A’s variable cost if no negotiation is assumed. The 
above Formula 1 for the thresholds remains unchanged. Moreover, the precise meaning 
of c becomes slightly different: it is A’s target contribution less A’s total variable costs 
as a proportion of maximum group contribution less A’s total variable costs. Division 
A’s target contribution as a proportion of maximum group contribution is given by the 
following formula: 
c + VCA p
c−1 .                                                        (3) 
 
 For example, if VCA/p=0.2, then Formula 3 can be written as 0.8c+0.2. 
Furthermore, if we want to make sure that A’s target contribution is 40%, then c can be 
found from 0.8c+0.2=0.4, i.e. c=0.25. Thus, from Table 2, x1=0.857, k=2, and we can 
use Formulae 1 and 2 to determine the transfer price schedule. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
 This paper has revisited the fundamental pragmatic-analytical model proposed 
by Tomkins (1990) and produced an approach to reduce the process of negotiation over 
prices and quantities which, in some contexts, may have serious limitations.  By 
introducing multiple transfer prices, it can be guaranteed that the proportion of group 
contribution over which negotiation is required does not exceed 1%. Equally, the model 
could be applied assuming a requirement to limit this proportion to a different level, 
such as, for instance, 3%.  This improvement thereby overcomes the potential 
disadvantage of the process of negotiation, while still keeping the attractive features of 
Tomkins’ model. The use of the new approach is straightforward. Indeed, using 
Formula 3 one can determine c and then from Table 2 find x1 and k. The transfer prices 
and the corresponding thresholds are calculated by Formulae 1 and 2. 
 
 Thus, in a single-group scenario, the proposed method will motivate divisional 
managers to make optimal economic decisions without undermining divisional 
autonomy, and provide a reasonable measure for evaluating the managerial and 
economic performance of the source and receiving divisions, while being equally 
acceptable for taxation purposes.  Furthermore, in situations where, along specified 
supply chains, unrelated companies have an overriding concern for the maintenance of 
trust, this model provides a mechanism for a ‘fair’ division of contribution without the 
need for potentially costly and trust-destroying negotiation. 
 
 We recognize that the analysis underlying this proposal is not without 
limitations: the model covers only a single period, not multiple periods; it is restricted 
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to a one-product scenario in a simple group structure, and uncertainty is not 
incorporated.  In addition we have assumed linearity of net average revenue curves. 
There is scope for further research to develop the model by relaxing each of these four 
assumptions.  Nevertheless, the model provides the basis for a way forward which 
assures approximate economic optimality while preserving some divisional autonomy 
and without requiring significant levels of potentially destructive negotiations.   
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Figure 1. Tomkins’ pragmatic-analytical cost plus transfer pricing approach.  
 
 
 
Table 1.   An illustration of the required negotiation, under the single transfer 
price model, given different divisions of total contribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Target contribution for 
source division as a 
proportion of maximum 
group contribution         
(c)  
Maximum proportion of 
optimal output for which 
the cost-plus transfer 
price can be applied      
(x) 
Proportion of group 
contribution over 
which negotiation is 
still required                 
(n) 
0.50 0.50 0.250 
0.48 0.60 0.160 
0.46 0.64 0.129 
0.42 0.70 0.090 
0.38 0.74 0.065 
0.32 0.80 0.040 
0.26 0.85 0.024 
0.18 0.90 0.010 
0.09 0.95 0.002 
0.00 1.00 0.000 
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Figure 2. An illustration of how a three transfer price arrangement would work.   
 
   
  
£ 
0                                                                      f1                      f2           f3      q     Output 
a =2p 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        p 
 
       t1 
 
 
 
 
       t2 
 
       t3 
NMRB 
n 
NARB 
     R1 
     R3 
     R2 
 19 
Table 2. The values of the basic parameters of the modified model. 
 
Target contribution for 
source division as a 
proportion of maximum 
group contribution         
(c)  
Number of 
transfer 
prices to be 
applied     
(k) 
Proportion of optimal 
output for which the 
first transfer price is 
applied                    
(x1) 
Proportion of 
optimal output over 
which the transfer 
prices are applied                   
(x) 
Proportion of group 
contribution over 
which negotiation is 
still required                                 
(n) 
0.66 4 0.505 0.940 0.004 
0.65 4 0.516 0.945 0.003 
0.64 4 0.528 0.950 0.002 
0.63 4 0.539 0.955 0.002 
0.62 3 0.545 0.906 0.009 
0.61 3 0.556 0.912 0.008 
0.60 3 0.567 0.919 0.007 
0.59 3 0.578 0.925 0.006 
0.58 3 0.589 0.931 0.005 
0.57 3 0.599 0.936 0.004 
0.56 3 0.609 0.940 0.004 
0.55 3 0.619 0.945 0.003 
0.54 3 0.629 0.949 0.003 
0.53 3 0.638 0.953 0.002 
0.52 3 0.648 0.956 0.002 
0.51 3 0.657 0.960 0.002 
0.50 3 0.666 0.963 0.001 
0.49 3 0.675 0.966 0.001 
0.48 3 0.684 0.968 0.001 
0.47 2 0.689 0.903 0.009 
0.46 2 0.698 0.909 0.008 
0.45 2 0.707 0.914 0.007 
0.44 2 0.716 0.919 0.007 
0.43 2 0.724 0.924 0.006 
0.42 2 0.732 0.928 0.005 
0.41 2 0.741 0.933 0.004 
0.40 2 0.749 0.937 0.004 
0.39 2 0.757 0.941 0.003 
0.38 2 0.765 0.945 0.003 
0.37 2 0.772 0.948 0.003 
0.36 2 0.780 0.952 0.002 
0.35 2 0.787 0.955 0.002 
0.34 2 0.795 0.958 0.002 
0.33 2 0.802 0.961 0.002 
0.32 2 0.809 0.964 0.001 
0.31 2 0.816 0.966 0.001 
0.30 2 0.823 0.969 0.001 
0.29 2 0.830 0.971 0.001 
0.28 2 0.837 0.973 0.001 
0.27 2 0.844 0.976 0.001 
0.26 2 0.850 0.978 0.001 
0.25 2 0.857 0.980 0.000 
0.24 2 0.864 0.982 0.000 
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0.23 2 0.870 0.983 0.000 
0.22 2 0.876 0.985 0.000 
0.21 2 0.883 0.986 0.000 
0.20 2 0.889 0.988 0.000 
0.19 2 0.895 0.989 0.000 
0.18 2 0.901 0.990 0.000 
0.17 1 0.906 0.906 0.009 
0.16 1 0.912 0.912 0.008 
0.15 1 0.918 0.918 0.007 
0.14 1 0.924 0.924 0.006 
0.13 1 0.930 0.930 0.005 
0.12 1 0.936 0.936 0.004 
0.11 1 0.942 0.942 0.003 
0.10 1 0.947 0.947 0.003 
0.09 1 0.953 0.953 0.002 
0.08 1 0.958 0.958 0.002 
0.07 1 0.964 0.964 0.001 
0.06 1 0.969 0.969 0.001 
0.05 1 0.974 0.974 0.001 
0.04 1 0.980 0.980 0.000 
0.03 1 0.985 0.985 0.000 
0.02 1 0.990 0.990 0.000 
0.01 1 0.995 0.995 0.000 
0.00 1 1.000 1.000 0.000 
 
 
